GNITN - Special Edition

Israel At War – Day 230

Did Netanyahu Know?

Were Warnings Signs There?

Many people, including myself wondered how one of the best if not the best intelligence agencies in the world didn’t foresee the Hamas attack on October 7th. In an article from i24news.tv we read more on the growing pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu to address this issue:

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has firmly rejected claims from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that he received multiple intelligence warnings throughout 2023, indicating how internal social upheaval might weaken Israel’s security and embolden its enemies.

The controversy centers on allegations that these warnings predicted conditions which could have led to the October 7 attack by Hamas.

I’ve heard from others who felt that the political upheaval before October 7th was one of the reasons for the attacks, but the question is did intelligence reports also see the signs in Hamas activity? The article goes on:

Netanyahu’s office issued a statement in response to a letter from the IDF, which outlined that he had received several military intelligence communiqués in the spring and summer of 2023. These communiqués reportedly warned that Israel’s enemies perceived the country’s social unrest—stemming from government attempts to reform the judicial system—as a sign of vulnerability.

The PM added this:

"Not only do none of the documents contain any warning about Hamas's intentions to attack Israel from Gaza, but on the contrary, they give a completely opposite assessment," the statement from Netanyahu's office read. The Prime Minister highlighted that the only two references to Hamas in the four documents in question suggested that the Palestinian terrorist group was not interested in escalating the conflict but was instead moving towards an agreement with Israel.

Netanyahu also shared that all of the security agencies got these documents:

Netanyahu pointed out that this assessment was consistently shared by all security agencies, which even claimed that Hamas had been deterred. He reiterated that the documents indicated Hamas’s strategy was to avoid conflict in Gaza and focus on other arenas. For example, one document from March 19, 2023, stated that Hamas intended to "leave the Gaza Strip on a backslope" and concentrate its struggle against Israel elsewhere. Another document from May 31, 2023, recommended that Israel should engage in a "regional de-escalation trend" and consider advancing a settlement with Hamas.

Protests Weakened Deterrence

We read in the same article that Netanyahu also said that it was even members of the military who protested his stance on the Supreme Court that could have tempted Hamas to decide to attack:

In addressing claims that the internal unrest had negatively impacted Israeli deterrence, Netanyahu stressed that he had warned of such risks multiple times throughout 2023. He referred to instances when air force and army reservists, along with other military personnel, froze their service in protest against the government's judicial reform measures during widespread protests. On July 17, 2023, for instance, he cautioned that the internal debate was "gnawing away at deterrence against our enemies who can easily be tempted into acts of aggression against us."

While the Prime Minister hasn’t taken blame for missing the attacks, others have:

Despite the Prime Minister's reassurances, senior defense officials have come forward accepting responsibility for the intelligence failures leading up to the October 7 attack. This has included the resignation of Israel's military intelligence chief, marking a significant admission of the lapses in readiness and anticipation.

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) maintains that warnings were given:

Earlier on Thursday, the IDF confirmed that Netanyahu received four distinct warning letters from intelligence services before October 7, dating from March to July 2023. These letters underscored concerns about the weakening of "Israeli deterrence" amid the ongoing crisis related to judicial reform. The documents suggested that adversaries like Iran and Hezbollah perceived a weakening in Israel's military power, its alliance with the United States, its strong economy, and its internal cohesion.

Depending on who interprets the warnings, blame is not going to be on the table until after the war ends. And regardless of those who have a political agenda like Benny Gantz, the calls for an investigation aren’t going anywhere and, in my opinion, should wait until after the war has ended.

Egypt Is Helping Hamas

Even though Israel and Egypt have a peace treaty, signs point to Egypt fighting against Israel every step of the way during the war in an opinion piece by Caroline B. Glick seen in The Jewish News Syndicate:

Israelis have long viewed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as an ally in the fight against the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran. Sisi, after all, led the Egyptian military in overthrowing Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood government of then-president Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Since the Hamas regime in Gaza played a key role in ousting former President Hosni Mubarak from power and assisting Muslim Brotherhood terrorists from escaping Egyptian prisons in the Sinai in 2011 and 2012, el-Sisi also shared Israel’s negative view of Hamas. He stood with Israel during the Hamas war against Israel in 2014.

Glick says those days are gone:

But over the past several years, Sisi’s position has changed. And since Oct. 7, Egypt’s role in Hamas’s build-up of its forces and military capabilities has come into sharp relief. Indeed, as the months have passed, the conclusion has become unavoidable that far from acting as a restraint on Hamas’s military and economic power as it did a decade ago, Egypt in recent years, and still today is a major state sponsor of Hamas.

Glick supports her opinion this way:

At every stage of the war—from the Oct. 7 Hamas invasion and slaughter on—el-Sisi’s regime has undermined Israel’s war effort in a bid to prevent the Jewish state from defeating Hamas. The motivations for Egypt’s support for Hamas are still difficult to assess. However, the financial interests of el-Sisi’s family appear to have been advanced significantly through cooperation with Hamas’s efforts to build tunnels across the border with Egypt. These operations have included smuggling weapons and raw materials for constructing weapons and tunnels, and transiting Hamas personnel between Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula.

Money seems to be playing a part:

On May 17, Israel revealed that during the early stages of the Israeli military’s operation to seize the international border zone between Egypt and Gaza in Rafah, the Israel Defense Forces discovered upwards of 50 underground tunnels that traverse the border between Gaza and Egypt. The scope of the cross-border tunnel project indicates that Egyptian authorities were not merely aware of Hamas’s operation. They were partners in Hamas’s efforts.

El-Sisi’s son, Gen. Mahmoud el-Sisi, serves as the deputy commander of Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate. He co-founded Organi Group with Ibrahim Organi, a Bedouin chief in the northern Sinai. Through two subsidiaries, the Organi Group controls all aspects of the border zone with Egypt. It is the broker, for instance, for all bribes by Gazans seeking to cross into Egypt. Reports estimate that since the beginning of the war, Organi has received tens of millions of dollars in payments from Gazans for permission to enter Egypt. Israel’s takeover of the border zone from Hamas will necessarily involve the loss of massive profits for the Organi Group and its stakeholders—Sheikh al-Organi and General el-Sisi.

Egypt’s efforts to undermine Israel’s military operations in Gaza have involved acts of intimidation, threats, diplomatic and legal warfare, and sabotage.

More Sniffing Of The Money Trail

If you wondered why a peaceful ally of Israel would refuse to allow Gazans to stay in Egypt while Hamas is dealt with in Gaza, which they said was to support the Palestinian cause or to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza both of which break clear international humanitarian aid law, follow even more of the money trail:

According to an investigative report in Tablet magazine, in exchange for its “moderating” role in mediating the war between Hamas and Israel, Egypt has received loans and investments from the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the United Arab Emirates totaling more than $50 billion. While Egypt was on the brink of insolvency on Oct. 6, this inflow of money has now secured Egypt’s financial viability for the next several years.

Glick notes that these tactics shouldn’t be working, but posits a few reasons why they are:

There is no objective reason that el-Sisi’s extortionist pro-Hamas policies should succeed. U.S. leverage over Egypt is considerable. Use of but a fraction of that leverage by the U.S. can induce a significant shift in Egypt’s actions, at least in the immediate term. But rather than use it, the Biden administration to date, has rewarded el-Sisi for siding with Hamas against Israel.

Egypt would not have received its cash infusion from the IMF, the European Union and the UAE without a green light from Washington, which also provides Egypt with $3 billion in military aid per year. Rather than demand that Egypt follow international humanitarian law and permit Gazans to flee the war zone to Egypt, the administration has firmly supported el-Sisi’s refusal to permit them to cross the border. Similarly, Washington has been as critical of Israel’s operation in Rafah as Egypt.

Glick suggests some ways to change Egypt’s duplicity:

Given the administration’s policy, it is time for American lawmakers who understand the danger Hamas’s survival poses to begin criticizing and Egypt’s nefarious role in facilitating Hamas’s weapons build-up and its success in building its warren of more than 400 miles of underground tunnels across Gaza and into Egypt. Egypt should see its aid tied to an end to its sponsorship of Hamas.

If Hamas survives, its perceived victory over Israel will of course inspire Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Shiite militia in Iraq and Syria and Iran itself to step up their assaults on the Jewish state. But it will also be an adrenalin shot for Islamists in the Western world to expand their terrorist attacks and other forms of political violence against Westerners and home and worldwide.

U.S. elected officials must express their disapproval of Egypt’s policies. They need to take action to undermine el-Sisi’s ability to maintain his pro-Hamas policies and anti-Israel brinkmanship by, among other things, tying U.S. fiscal support and military assistance to Egypt to an end to its cooperative relationship with Hamas; its political warfare against Israel; and threats to abrogate the peace treaty with the Jewish state.